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Standard of review: Correction of error. Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d
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or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case: This is an action arising out of an agreement, reached after months
of negotiation, under which appellant, The Geothermal Company ("Geothermal"), was to acquire
a 50% operating interest in two Nevada power plants and related assets. Appellee Steamboat
Development Corp. ("SDC"), a subsidiary of appellee Far West Capital, Inc. ("FWC"), was to
own the other 50%. After the agreement was reached and a number of details addressed, and
within a few weeks of closing, FWC refused to close. FWC claimed that the power plants were
performing better financially and that they wanted more money for the sale. Geothermal brought
five claims for relief— four alternative claims sounding in contract, and a claim for fraud.
Course of proceedings and disposition below: The action was filed on July 2, 1999.
FWC and SDC moved to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) on August 20, 1999. The issues were
briefed and argued, and the trial court ruled from the bench on November 29, 1999, dismissing
the claims with prejudice. The Order and Judgment was entered on December 16, 1999. A copy
of the Judgment is Exhibit D in the appendix. Geothermal filed a Notice of Appeal on April 7,
2000 following the trial court's grant of additional time in which to file that notice. (R. 177,
189). The Supreme Court denied appellees' motion for summary disposition on May 22, 2000.
(R. 196). The appeal was transferred to this court on June 28, 2000. (R. 211).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Preamble:

In the trial court and on appeal the material factual allegations of the

complaint are presumed true for purposes of a motion under rule 12(b)(6).

Reedeker v.

Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah App. 1998). A copy of the complaint is attached as Exhibit
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A and incorporated by this reference. Rather than simply repeating the entire complaint, certain
key facts are provided below.
Far West Capital, Inc. ("FWC") and Steamboat Development Corporation ("SDC") own
and operate a Nevada geothermal resource project consisting of four power plants, numbered
Steamboat I, IA, II and III. (R. 2, f 7, 8). At the time, FWC and SDC lease the property from
three landowners. Id. f 7. On August 10 and 11, 1994, FWC and Geothermal ("Geothermal")
signed a Letter of Intent for the shared management and acquisition of interests in the power
plants. (R. 3, | 11). A copy of that letter of intent is attached as Exhibit B (the "Letter
Agreement").
The August 10 Letter Agreement "sets out the principal terms of am agreement" regarding
the power plants. (R. 46). Under the Letter Agreement, Geothermal was to acquire a 50% joint
venture interest in Steamboat II and III power plants and related assets in exchange for a capital
contribution of $4 million. (R. 46; 3, f 11). Geothermal was to participate on a "joint executive
control basis in all management aspects of the joint venture" in a newly formed LLC. (R. 4647).
The parties agreed that the Letter Agreement was a binding agreement and that they
would "execute such further definitive agreements as necessary to carry out the terms of this
Agreement, but the parties specifically agree that no other material matters remain beyond those
set out in this Agreement." (R. 3, f 12; R. 53, f 13).
The parties later modified the Letter Agreement (following an earlier minor modification)
on February 3, 1995. (R. 4, \ 14; R. 57). A copy of the February 3 agreement is attached as
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Exhibit C. The modifications in the February 3 Agreement were the result of negotiations with
an investment banker and an investor arranged by Geothermal. (R. 4, f 14). The parties agreed
that July 31 was a deadline for closing the transaction. (R. 60).
The February 3 Agreement contains the following material terms:
7. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein or in the
Letter of Intent dated August 10, 1994, and its first modification dated
October 26, 1994, any and all commitments, responsibilities and/or
obligations which have been set forth either in writing or verbally are not
binding upon either party, except for the confidentiality agreements
dated December 2, 1994 which will remain in full force for the term as
specified in those agreements, until such time as TGCo delivers to FWC
and FWC receives the proceeds of the three hundred thousand dollars
($300,000) loan as contemplated by the Lol and this Revision. Further,
FWC and TGCo mutually agree that FWC has sole right not to accept
the three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) loan from TGCo if the
terms and conditions thereof, as they are more fully described in loan
documents yet to be created, are not acceptable for any reason
whatsoever or if the business terms and conditions associated with the
loan are unfavorable in the sole opinion of FWC. Further, the Lol and
this Revision comprise the total good faith negotiations, representations,
responsibilities and obligations to date which may exist between FWC
and TGCo and the conditions under which FWC may agree to accept,
extend or modify the same are subject to the approval of the FWC Board
of Directors and shall only become binding upon FWC with that
approval.
(R.59,17).
The February 3 Agreement also requires the parties to cooperate in completing the
transaction. (R. 59-60).
On May 25, 1995, Geothermal's legal council, Winston & Strawn, delivered to FWC and
SDC a Confidential Private Placement Memorandum, which contained all of the final terms of
the transaction. (R. 4-5, f 15). FWC confirmed several times that all the terms and conditions of
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the agreement were acceptable and consistent with the Letter Agreement and the February 3
Agreement, and specifically that FWC's directors had approved the agreements. (R. 5, f 16).
Geothermal tendered performance as of May 25, 1995. For a period of several weeks
after May 25, FWC would not cooperate in signing necessary documents and otherwise
finalizing matters in anticipation of the closing. (R. 5, | 17). Eventually, the parties met on July
1, 1995 and discussed a number of items in the Offering Memorandum and other terms of the
agreements. (R. 5,120). Those items included the payment terms and their tax implications and
anticipated legal and associated closing costs. (R. 5-6, f 20.a-d). FWC and SDC planned further
review of the documents. (R. 6).
Geothermal understood that the final issues were resolved based on FWC's and SDC's
own statements at the July 1 meeting. (R. 6, ]f 21). The tax issues had not changed from the
original Letter Agreement and, of particular importance to FWC, Geothermal was to pay
$300,000 cash to cover the anticipated closing costs. (R. 6, f 21.a-d).
On July 5, FWC and SDC cancelled the agreements, claiming "that the projects were
performing better than expected so defendants no longer needed any financing" and that they
wanted more money than originally agreed. (R. 7, f 22). By that time, Geothermal had provided
over $2 million in legal, accounting, investment banking and other consulting services benefiting
FWC and SDC. (R. 10-11, f 42-45).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The breach of contract claim carried certain inherently factual issues because of

ambiguous contract language. The trial court may not resolve factual disputes when deciding a
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motion under rule 12(b)(6). Neither can the trial court decide that one party's version of events
is more plausible than another. Under rule 12(b)(6), the complaint describes the universe of
facts. As long as something more than mere conclusions are pled, the complaint survives that
early-stage test of whether a claim has been stated. Contract interpretation and disputed reasons
for cancellation and an integration clause that seems to integrate nothing are not the kinds of
things that ordinarily support a sound dismissal. The issue of good faith and fair dealing was
central to whether FWC could cancel. It claims to have cancelled because it was unhappy with
the terms of a loan. But this loan never had any terms—it was never proposed—and was
replaced, with FWC's agreement, with a cash payment.
II.

The trial court dismissed the quasi-contract claim because "the parties had a

written agreement." Whether there is an enforceable agreement (a writing has nothing to do with
it), is only the first question on a quantum meruit claim. The next question is, if the legal claim
on the express agreement fails, has a benefit nevertheless been given that ought to be paid for?
Even if a building contractor breaches, that contractor is entitled to payment at least in the
amount to compensate for the work actually done if the value exceeds damages caused by the
breach. That is Geothermal's claim. It provided significant services to FWC, including legal
and accounting work, tax advice and other benefits that come with a transaction of this size and
complexity. FWC got all the benefit of that work. It should be paid for.
III.
purview.

The statute of frauds governs modifications to agreements already within its
It does not cover immaterial changes, however.

agreement need to be in writing.

Only material changes to the

That rule carries a well-known exception for partial
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performance or reliance. Geothermal did not prepare loan documents because they were never
needed. Then FWC used the loan (and more precisely the "terms and conditions . . . more fully
described in loan documents yet to be created . . .") as the basis for canceling. Geothermal
believed it had an agreement to reimburse the costs the loan was intended to cover, so no loan
agreements were prepared.
ARGUMENT
I.
BECAUSE OF A NUMBER OF FACTUAL DISPUTES, IMPROPERLY
RESOLVED UNDER RULE 12(b)(6), THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE CONTRACT CLAIMS.
A trial court can decide some issues incorrectly and still survive appeal. State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994). Dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is not one of them. That is,
since the advent of notice pleading, dismissal at such an early stage requires the confluence of a
number of factors, all of which are designed to ensure that the parties litigate their claims—all of
them if possible. See, e.g., Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268,
275 (Utah App. 1996)("the fundamental purpose of the liberalized pleading rules is to afford
parties the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their
dispute, subject only to the requirement that their adversaries have fair notice of the nature and
basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation
involved.")(internal quotations and citations omitted).
The trial court must, first, accept the plaintiffs factual allegations as entirely true, and
second invoke any available reasonable inferences in favor of the claims. Reedeker v. Salisbury,
952 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah App. 1998). See also Colman v. Utah State Land Brd, 795 P.2d 622,
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624 (Utah 1990). Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah App. 1992).
The court must "consider all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff).
The test does not even stop at the four corners of the complaint. The court must then
engage itself almost as an advocate for the plaintiff to decide whether "any set of facts" could be
pled to support the claims. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App.
1991). And dismissal is not available unless it "clearly appears," or there is "certainty," that
even with those unpled facts the plaintiff cannot recover. Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 430
(Utah App. 1996); Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1998).
This Court engages in the same analysis, employing a "generous standard of review."
Olson, 815 P.2d at 1360. "Dismissal of a claim under rule 12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the
liberality of notice pleading, and must be granted only when it is apparent that under no set of
facts proven in support of the claim as pleaded would a party be entitled to relief." Id.
The review here is de novo, which is to say that dismissal is defmitionally a question of
law, which in turn means that the trial court's result is afforded no deference. Anderson, 841
P.2d at 744. "In reviewing the dismissal, [the appellate court] must keep in mind that the
purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief,
not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a case." Whipple v. American Fork Irrig. Co.,
910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). Plainly, any material factual dispute requires denial. See
Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6, 10 (Utah App. 1994) (factual issues in contract
claims prevent 12(b)(6) dismissal).

7

AM

The breach of contract claim should not have been dismissed.

The first two questions in contract interpretation are integration and ambiguity. Ron Case
Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blonquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). If the contract is
integrated and unambiguous, its plain terms control, and the writing is interpreted as a matter of
law. See Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).
If the contract (or the specific term at issue) is ambiguous, then parol evidence is
admissible to discover the parties' intent. Interwest Constr. Co. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359
(Utah 1996). If parol evidence does not resolve the ambiguity, then it is construed against the
drafter. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Hertford, 772 P.2d 466, 469 (Utah App. 1989).
FWC and SDC invoked paragraph 7 of the February 3, 1995 agreement to demonstrate
their right to terminate the entire transaction.

(R. 25)("On July 5, 1995, [FWC] notified

Geothermal that it was exercising this right, ending the contemplated transaction.

[FWC's]

termination of the transaction did not breach its agreement with Geothermal."). The trial court
agreed.

(R. 140)("Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the parties' letter of intent, in

particular paragraph 7 [of the February 3, 1995 letter of intent], the defendants exercised their
right to cancel the agreement and not proceed with the contemplated transaction.").
1.

Finding that the agreement is integrated was error.

Implicit in the trial court's ruling is the factual finding that the agreement is integrated.
And it is here where error begins. Integration means that the parties have adopted the writing "as
the final and complete expression of the agreement." Hall v. Process Instruments & Control,
Inc., 866 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). This is initially a question of fact.
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Id. and n.3. Like any other factual question, it cannot be resolved as a matter of law unless the
facts are undisputed. If found, integration means that terms not found in the writing are deemed
outside the parties' agreement. Id. (Citations omitted).
FWC and SDC argued integration. They claimed below that "[a]n oral agreement is
contrary to the parties' intent." (R. 26). The trial court agreed. Relying on the statute of frauds
and "clear and unambiguous language in paragraph 7," the court ruled that "oral modifications
and/or agreements were prohibited." (R. 141).
This is the "clear and unambiguous" language:
Further, the Lol and this Revision comprise the total good faith
negotiations, representations, responsibilities and obligations to date
which may exist between FWC and [Geothermal] and the conditions
under which FWC may agree to accept, extend or modify the same are
subject to the approval of the FWC Board of Directors and shall only
become binding upon FWC with that approval.
(R. 59, J 7).
This portion of paragraph 7 says many things, but it does not say that the written
documents comprise the entire agreement. It limits integration to the letter of intent and the
February 3 revision containing the "negotiations, representations, responsibilities and obligations
to date . . . ." Compare that to the typical integration clause, which much more categorically
denies any other agreements outside the written document. This language actually contemplates
that other modifications can happen and that board approval is required.
Because agreements must be read as a whole, with all of the terms considered, See Pierce
v. Pierce, 994 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 2000), and cases cited, there is more that demonstrates the at-
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best provisional nature of this so-called integration clause: paragraph 7 provides that other
agreements will in fact be made. The terms of the anticipated $300,000 loan were yet to be
drafted and agreed on, based on "terms and conditions" to be "more fully described in loan
documents yet to be created . . . ." (R. 59, f 7). Plainly, further negotiations were expected.
And if so, it is just as possible that, instead of a loan, FWC would agree to take cash to cover the
closing costs.
Developments following the February, 1995 agreement (which was the second
modification to the original August, 1994 agreement) demonstrate that the writing was not the
final agreement on the issue of the loan. Geothermal tendered performance as of May 25, 1995.
(R. 5, | 16). But during the following several weeks, FWC and SDC would not cooperate even
in signing the basic documents to complete the formation of the proposed partnership. (R. 5, f
17), presumably because of outstanding issues or concerns.
Finally, principals on both sides met on July 1, 1995 to resolve certain mechanical issues,
such as "a misunderstanding by [appellees] of certain payment terms and [their] tax
implications," the "mechanics of the subordination agreement," the closing date and appellee's
concern over closing and legal costs. (R. 5-6, f 20 a-d).
Those matters were hammered out at that meeting, based on appellee's own statements.
(R. 6, | 21). It is not as though Geothermal alleged it attempted to impose some new, oral
modification. The oral modification—specifically the agreement to pay the legal and closing
costs with cash rather than a loan—was agreed to by FWC and SDC. (R. 6, f 21 a-d). Perhaps
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they could have insisted on borrowing money, but they did not. They were happy to accept a
cash reimbursement instead.
The integration language of paragraph 7 means little in light of those subsequent
developments because the issues were raised by FWC and SDC, and resolved to their
satisfaction. (R. 6, If 21). And the inference is that, having been satisfied regarding those funds,
appellees looked for other reasons to cancel, claiming instead that they wanted more money. (R.
6-7,122). Plainly, the parties built into their agreement an exception to any intended integration
for the anticipated loan agreement. And if they were free to negotiate a loan, they were free not
to, and to instead agree on something else—in this case an offer of free money instead of a loan.
FWC and SDC argued further that no oral modification was possible because the FWC
board of directors had to approve first. (R. 26). Two of FWC's directors attended the July 1
meeting. (R. 5, f 19). FWC had already confirmed that the deal would close as scheduled on
July 31. (R. 5, f 16). Nothing material changed at the July 1 meeting—based on appellee's own
statements that the issues discussed there were resolved. (R. 6, f 21). At that point, with every
conceivable detail addressed, whether FWC prepared formal minutes of a director meeting was
hardly enough to kill the deal.
B.
There was a factual dispute, created by FWC, over the reason for terminating
the transaction.
Appellees claimed as follows concerning cancellation:
Pursuant to the second written modification dated February 3, 1995,
[FWC] had the unilateral right to terminate the transaction for any
reason whatsoever. The second modification expressly agrees:
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FWC . . . and [Geothermal] mutually agree that FWC has sole right not
to accept the three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) loan from
[Geothermal] if the terms and conditions thereof, as they are more fully
described in loan documents yet to be created, are not acceptable for any
reason whatsoever or if the business terms and conditions associated
with the loan are unfavorable in the sole opinion of FWC.
(R. 25)(emphasis added).
After quoting that language, appellees claimed, "[tjhis language clearly grants [FWC] the
right to reject the financing documents 'yet to be created' 'for any reason whatsoever' 'in the
sole opinion of FWC." On July 5, 1995, [FWC] notified Geothermal that it was exercising this
right, ending the contemplated transaction." (R. 25)(emphasis added).
The right FWC exercised, according to FWC, was the right to reject a loan. And without
the loan proceeds, the deal was dead. This is the heart of the cancellation issue. At the meeting
on July 1, FWC was anxious about closing costs. (R. 5-6, f 20.d.). To assuage this concern,
Geothermal agreed at that meeting to pay cash to cover the closing costs—up to $300,000 and to
provide a letter of credit to secure that payment. (R. 6, ^f 21.d.). The cash was coming from the
financing proceeds Geothermal had arranged for the overall purchase. Id
Therefore, FWC's ability to cancel the entire $4 million dollar deal over a $300,000 loan
was gone as of July 1, 1999, based on their agreement that it was. That was a modification FWC
wanted and to which Geothermal agreed. FWC knew that, and found another reason to cancel:
"the projects were performing better than expected so [appellees] no longer needed any
financing, and more importantly, that [appellees] wanted more money than originally agreed."
(R. 6-74 22).
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Despite the after the fact claim (R. 25), cancellation was not about the loan at all. The
trial court overlooked the facts in the complaint in favor of appellees' contrary assertions about
their reasons for canceling. At oral argument, they took that factual issue a step further, arguing
inferences that should have been construed the other way.
Counsel argued as follows regarding the issue of paying the closing costs:
And the $300,000 is mentioned at (d) as a further accommodation.
Plaintiffs representatives agreed to reimburse any reasonable closing
costs up to $300,000 out of plaintiff s financing proceeds and to provide
a letter of credit to this effect. . . .[T]hat is not cash on the table. That is
$300,000 ~ they don't say anywhere in this complaint that we orally
agreed to substitute the $300,000 loan for $300,000 cash. They said they
agreed to give us a letter of credit. The operating statement states
implicitly that they don't have any operating history and that the note
(inaudible) does not have nor is it expected to have any significant assets
or sources of funds. A promise to pay $300,000 by a corporation that
has no operating history and no money is worthless.
(Tr. 27).
On a motion under 12(b)(6), defendants do not get to make this argument. The complaint
establishes the universe of available facts for purposes of the motion. Available inferences are
construed in the plaintiffs favor, and indeed unpled but possible facts are essentially assumed to
determine whether "any set of facts" can be pled to support the claim. Here, the complaint
alleges that, instead of a loan to FWC, Geothermal was going to use funds from its loan proceeds
to pay the closing costs that so concerned FWC. (R. 21.d). The allegation is that Geothermal
agreed to "reimburse" the closing costs from the loan proceeds. Id. That describes cash.
But the excerpt just quoted raises factual issues about credit-worthiness and bank
accounts. FWC argued that, regardless of whether there actually was an agreement at the July 1
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meeting—and the complaint alleges there was—it would not be a smart deal for FWC. That, of
course, is not the test. This is where reasonable inferences come in. If Geothermal was such a
bad risk for the relatively small amount of $300,000, it certainly never concerned FWC in the
first place from agreeing to a 50/50 partnership and a multimillion dollar transaction.
FWC's protestations about Geothermal's operating history and whether its promises were
"worthless" are irrelevant in the 12(b)(6) analysis. And moreover, if that was FWC's view of
matters, it certainly did not dissuade them from the lengthy and expensive negotiations and
preparations for the closing. Recall that Geothermal had provided over $2 million in accounting,
legal, investment banking and consulting efforts in preparation for this closing. (R. 11, f 45).
If Geothermal was a poor credit risk and was unable to get its financing, and thus could
not close with FWC, then there was no risk to FWC and no closing costs to worry about.
Perhaps the letter of credit was merely intended to assure FWC that the loan for the overall
transaction was going to fund and that FWC could be assured its closing costs would be covered
with cash. That is a reasonable inference, but one apparently never drawn. But more to the
point, such plainly disputed factual matters on a 12(b)(6) motion should be enough by
themselves to defeat the motion.
C.

The trial court improperly resolved the factual issue of ambiguity.

Also implicit also in the trial court's ruling, of course, is the conclusion that the
agreement, or at least paragraph 7's language on the issue of cancellation, is free of ambiguity.
(R. 144). Which is to say, that even though no express ruling is made on that issue, the trial
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court must have concluded that it is unambiguous and so was free to interpret it as a matter of
law.
The trial court ruled as follows: "Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the parties'
letter of intent, in particular paragraph 7 of the second amendment to the letter of intent, the
defendants exercised their right to cancel the agreement and not proceed with the contemplated
transaction." (R. 144).
That critical paragraph provides that the agreement was not final until the loan proceeds
were received. (R. 59, f 7). Cancellation was conditioned on the acceptability of the loan terms
as follows:
FWC . . . and [Geothermal] mutually agree that FWC has sole right not
to accept the three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) loan from
[Geothermal] if the terms and conditions thereof, as they are more fully
described in loan documents yet to be created, are not acceptable for any
reason whatsoever or if the business terms and conditions associated
with the loan are unfavorable in the sole opinion of FWC.
(R. 59).
Paragraph 7's first sentence says two things.

It says first that the confidentiality

agreements are binding. It then says that the original letter of intent and its October 26, 1994 and
February 3, 1995 modifications are not binding until receipt of the $300,000 loan. It then says
that FWC can reject the loan "if the terms and conditions thereof... are not acceptable for any
reason whatsoever or if the business terms and conditions associated with the loan are
unfavorable" in FWC's sole opinion. (R. 59).
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Cancellation could be based only on rejection of the loan. That is at least a plausible
reading of the language. But appellees argued something different below. They claimed they
could terminate, based on the "plain language of the contract," for any reason, suggesting that
displeasure with the loan agreement was just one of an infinite range of available reasons for
cancellation. (R. 100).
Whether the language supports that broad reading is a question of fact as long as the
competing interpretations are plausible. Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1998)
(language in a written agreement is ambiguous if it may be understood to support two or more
plausible meanings). One rule is clear: "courts endeavor to construe contracts so as not to grant
one of the parties an absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a contract." Pierce, 994 P.2d at
198.
The exclusive basis for cancellation was removed at the July 1 meeting when cash instead
of the loan was agreed to. (R. 6, f 21.d.). FWC and SDC, on the other hand, argued that
cancellation was available, either for any reason they could dream up, or because of the loan
transaction. (R. 25, 99-100). So the factual issue of what was finalized eit the July 1 meeting is a
critical determination, and one the trial court could not make under rule 12(b)(6).
Since Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), the correct
approach to the question of ambiguity is less than clear. Ward held that "[w]hen determining
whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." Id. at 268. Time
was when ambiguity was a purely legal issue - a threshold question of law for the trial court. See
Winegar Corp., 813 P.2d at 108.
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Since Ward, however, it is unclear how a trial court is to decide the issue of ambiguity.
Contract interpretation cases since then have ignored Ward's requirement that "any relevant
evidence must be considered." (emphasis added). In Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 987 P.2d 48
(Utah 1999), the Court backtracks to its pre-Ward position: "Whether contract language is
ambiguous is a question of law." Dixon does not even cite Ward.
Perhaps there is no conflict and Ward means only that the trial court should take into
account the surrounding circumstances and evident purpose(s) of the agreement to decide
whether it is ambiguous. See Ward, 907 P.2d at 268. Either way, this issue takes on an entirely
new face in the midst of a 12(b)(6) motion. Consideration of any fact outside the complaint
requires denial, or the express conversion to a summary judgment motion with its attendant
considerations. The trial court cannot even draw an adverse inference.
Here, cancellation was limited to whether the loan terms, evaluated in good faith, were
acceptable. Because the complaint alleges there was no loan at all - by mutual agreement - there
was nothing to evaluate. For the trial court to rule as it did, it must have decided the factual
question that, somehow, FWC could in good faith reject loan terms it never saw.
D.
Canceling as they have claimed, FWC and SDC breached their covenant of
goodfaith andfair dealing.
In Utah, all contracts are overlaid with an additional promise, imposed by the law, that
parties to a contract deal fairly and in good faith. Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food
& Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
Rights granted expressly or by implication must be exercised reasonably and in good faith. Id.
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See also Cook v. Zions Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996). ("When one party to a contract
retains power or sole discretion in an express contract, it must exercise that discretion reasonably
and in good faith."). The party with a certain degree of freedom to act under the agreement may
do so only in so far as such action does not deny the other party the benefits of the agreement.
889 P.2d at 450.
The position appellees took in this case is the same tried and rejected in Olympus Hills.
There, a lease permitted "any" lawful retail business. Smith's opened a canned food store in
space it had once used as its full service grocery store. Smith's argued that the express language
of the lease trumped any good faith requirement. This Court thought the better of it: "contracting
parties, hard as they may try, cannot reduce every understanding to a stated term. Instances
inevitably arise in which one party exercises discretion retained in a way that denies the other a
reasonably expected benefit of the bargain." Id. at 450.
"[G]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 205 cmt. a (1979). This is so that both sides are

assured that the agreement they have reached is what they can count on. It is a notion entirely
consistent with the most fundamental precept in contracts—that the intentions of the parties
control their contractual relationship.
As this Court observed on that point in Olympus Hills:
The good faith performance doctrine may be said to permit the exercise
of discretion for any purpose-including ordinary business purposesreasonably within the contemplation of the parties. A contract thus
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would be breached by a failure to perform in good faith if a party uses its
discretion for a reason outside the contemplated range-a reason beyond
the risks assumed by the party claiming a breach.
889 P.2d at 451 (citations omitted).
Although the agreement allows for cancellation if the loan is not acceptable, it does so
only if "the terms and conditions thereof, as they are more fully described in loan documents yet
to be created, . . .or if the business terms and conditions associated with the loan are
unfavorable . . . ." (R. 59, f 7)(emphasis added). No loan documents were created, nor did they
need to be after the July 1 meeting. And neither were there any "business terms and conditions"
associated with a loan, again because the loan idea was scrapped in favor of a no strings attached
reimbursement of the anticipated closing costs. (R. 6, f 21.d).
FWC repeatedly referred to this right, contending at the hearing below that "if [FWC]
doesn't like that loan for any reason, they don't have to go forward with the deal. They have no
obligation unless they like that $300,000 loan." (Tr. 10, 11.15-18). FWC argued below that
paragraph 7 allowed an unlimited cancellation right. (R. 25). That is not what the agreement
says; nor does that argument square with the law. It was a very narrow right, ultimately vitiated
by the agreement to accept a cash reimbursement instead of a loan. (R. 6, Tf 21.d).
If FWC's reason for canceling—that it was unhappy with the terms of the loan—is
accepted (which requires that the contrary allegation in the complaint be ignored, see R. 6-7, f
22), then it is impossible that the cancellation right was exercised in good faith. Cancellation
depended on the terms and conditions in documents never created. Those terms and conditions
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could never have been deemed "unfavorable/' One is left only to wonder just what FWC's "sole
opinion" was based on given that it never had any terms and conditions to review.
Plainly, FWC had wide discretion to decide whether to accept the loan.

But the

complaint makes clear that the issue was never reached. Geothermal was entitled to expect that
the agreement to pay the closing costs vitiated any cancellation because of what amounted to a
relatively insignificant loan, given the size of the larger transaction and given that it was paying
the amount in cash.

To sanction FWC's cancellation based on paragraph 7 ignores the

conditions placed on that right and places too much on the "sole right" language in that section.
In Resource Management, Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028
(Utah 1985), an agreement could be terminated based on one party's "sole discretion" after a
determination that certain conditions were present. Id at 1034. But the Supreme Court made it
clear that the "sole discretion" right to cancel was still subject to the good faith and fair dealing
term inherent in the agreement. Id. at 1037-38. "Notwithstanding the breadth of [the power to
determine whether cancellation conditions were met], it may not be exercised capriciously or in
bad faith." Id at 1038.
The right to terminate, despite the "sole discretion" language was "circumscribed by the
requirement that it exercise it in good faith . . . only on a reasonable belief that the [conditions for
canceling were satisfied]." Id. at 1038. "[A]n implied covenant of good faith forbids arbitrary
action by one party that disadvantages the other." Id. at 1037.
Implicit on this point is the question of whether the cancellation was exercised reasonably
and in good faith. The trial court appears to have accepted FWC's version of events and to have

20

resolved as a matter of law that the cancellation right was exercised reasonably and in good faith
despite the fact that FWC had no loan documents to review and reject. Those are factual matters
made all the more factual because of the issue of whether the loan was replaced with cash.
Another available inference is derived from the factual allegation that Geothermal
"agreed to reimburse" the closing costs. (R. 6, f 21.d). For Geothermal to "agree" suggests it
did so at FWC's request or insistence. If so, FWC gave up the right to cancel because there
would be no loan terms to consider.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING THE QUANTUM
MERUIT CLAIM.
An enforceable written or oral agreement covering the subject matter of the litigation
precludes recovery on a quasi contract theory. Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 425
(Utah App. 1994). But that rule does not answer the question of how to compensate a party who
has bestowed a benefit on another, even if done in connection with an unenforceable express
agreement.
That issue was answered in Kurzet.

There, the parties had an agreement for the

construction of a home. Dissatisfied with performance, the owner terminated the construction
company when the house was 10% complete. The contractor sued on the agreement. Having
breached, however, the contractor was not entitled to recover on the agreement. But that was not
a bar to recovery under quasi-contract.
The only issue was whether the contractor's performance, "though less than substantial[,]
has conferred benefits on the [non-breaching party] in excess of [the] injury . . . ." 876 P.2d at
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426. The non-breaching party is discharged from performing under the express contract, "but
may have a quasi-contractual duty to pay the value of the benefit conferred in excess of the
damage caused by the . . . breach." Id. at 425. In other words, having breached, the contractor
could not rely on the express agreement covering the work, but could nevertheless recover in
quasi-contract for that same work. Id.
All that is needed in this regard is a benefit conferred that ought to be paid for. Here, the
allegations established just that. Geothermal provided legal, accounting, investment banking and
consulting services with a value of over $2 million. (R. 11, Tj 42-45). In this case, the trial court
ruled that there was no breach—by either side—but that is not a reason to then deny the quantum
meruit recovery.
The trial court ruled that Geothermal had no remedy on the express contract. But the
court also dismissed the quasi-contract claim because "the parties had a written agreement." (R.
145). Perhaps the court meant to say "express" rather than "written."

The fact that the

agreement is written is irrelevant to the unjust enrichment claim. The next question the trial
court should have but never asked was whether some benefit had been given that still needed to
be paid for, despite its ruling that the express agreement had not been breached.
F WC and SDC were tutored in the tax implications of the transaction, the operation of a
subordination agreement, and legal and accounting issues.

(R. 5, f 20, 45).

Partnership

documents were prepared and delivered, as were security instruments, subordination agreements
and other documents. (R. 5, f 17). Appellees obtained a template for doing their next deal,
presumably at a higher price, on Geothermal's nickel. These are benefits typical of transactions
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of this size and complexity. At a minimum, regardless of whether FWC conjured a reason for
canceling, those benefits should be paid for. That is the basis for the quasi-contract claim.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS TO THE ORAL MODIFICATION UNDER WHICH GEOTHERMAL
WAS TO PAY CASH FOR THE CLOSING COSTS RATHER THAN PROVIDE A
LOAN.
Agreements for the transfer of an interest in real property must be in writing.
CODE ANN

UTAH

§ 25-1-1. The corollary to that rule is that modifications to such agreements must

also be in writing.

Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986).

But not all

modifications: only material changes need to be written. ld.\ Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P.2d 575,
579 (Utah App. 1993)("[g]enerally, if an original agreement was required to comply with the
statute of frauds, any material modification of that agreement must also conform to the statute of
frauds")(emphasis added).
Here, the issue resolved at the July 1 meeting was whether appellees' closing costs would
be covered by a loan or by some other means. "[A]s a further accommodation, [Geothermal]
agreed to reimburse any reasonable closing costs up to $300,000 out of [Geothermal's] financing
proceeds and to provide a letter of credit to this effect." (R. 6, f 21 .d.).
Whatever rights FWC had concerning the proposed loan were purchased by Geothermal
for a guarantee of cash. But more importantly, this is an immaterial change to the agreement. It
changed nothing with regard to the overall transaction. The amount was the same; the relative
interests remained the same; the property was the same.
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The written agreement, properly understood, contemplates such an agreement, or at least
leaves open the possibility for it.

The "terms and conditions" of the loan had not been

negotiated. They still had to be agreed to and memorialized in "loan documents yet to be created
. . . ." (R. 59, |7). If the parties reserved the right to negotiate the loan, then plainly they were
free to decide on some other method of payment to cover the anticipated costs—in this case a
cash reimbursement. Contracting parties are as free to modify all or part of an agreement as they
were to agree in the first place. See Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah App. 1995).
Certainly such an insignificant change is not material enough to warrant protection under
the statute of frauds. Protection, after all, is its purpose. The statute is not a sword, such that it is
refuge for a party looking to repudiate an otherwise valid agreement. See, e.g., Stangl v. Ernst
Home Ctr., Inc., 948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997), and cases cited.
The facts as established in the complaint also suggest (read infer) that the oral
modification is subject to the part performance exception to the statute of frauds. "[I]f a party has
changed his position by performing an oral modification so that it would be inequitable to permit
the other party to found a claim upon the original agreement^] . . . the modified agreement
should be held valid." Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1171. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The trial court could have inferred, but did not, that Geothermal would have prepared
loan documents for FWC to summarily reject (as was its apparent intention) but for the oral
modification to the agreement.

Geothermal left the July 1 meeting fully and reasonably

expecting the transaction to close.

(R. 21).
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It may have acted differently, including the

preparation of loan documents for FWC's review, had FWC demanded to borrow money rather
than accept the onerous gift of cash.1
CONCLUSION
The only way to explain dismissal is that factual issues were resolved, and resolved in
appellees' favor.

One factual issue in particular stands out: FWC's reason for canceling.

Regardless of the formalities and sometimes academic use of the statute of frauds, plaintiff
alleged that cancellation was based on FWC's sudden desire to up the price after the power
plants were performing better than anticipated. FWC argued that it cancelled based on the
unacceptable terms of a loan that had no terms. The trial court also resolved the factual question
of integration—factual because the language of the agreement on that point is anything but clear.
The trial court seems also to have overlooked FWC's obligation of good faith. If FWC is to be
believed, it cancelled because it deemed as "unfavorable" loan terms never proposed, inside loan

"An agreement to terminate or rescind a contract must be in writing if the contract that
is extinguished falls within the Statute of Frauds." SCM Land Co. v. Watkins, Faber, 732 P.2d
105, 108_ (Utah 1986), citing Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986); Cutright v.
Union Savings & Investment Co., 94 P. 984, 985 (Utah 1908). This rule, however, may or may
not apply to this case. It suggests circumstances where the parties agree mutually to cancel an
agreement governed by the statute of frauds. Here, cancellation could be unilateral, but plainly
based on only certain conditions and still subject to the good faith obligation.
There is a good reason for this rule, made apparent by none other than this case.
Cancellation was plainly a right, though a narrowly defined one, left to FWC. To avoid fraud,
the party wishing to cancel must exercise that right according to the agreement, in part to avoid
the possibility of specific performance imposed by the other party. In other words, there can be
no doubt about cancellation if it is written, if for example, the timing of the cancellation was
critical. As it happens, timing matters in this case. FWC cancelled before it even saw the "terms
and conditions" of the loan.

25

documents never prepared. If bent on canceling, it could have at least waited to get the loan
documents before rejecting them.
In any case, dismissal was error. The matter should be reversed and remanded.
DATED this

of October, 2000
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.

DAVID C. WRIGHT (556^
Attorneys for The Geothermal Company
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE GEOTHERMAL COMPANY, a Nevada
COMPLAINT

Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Civil No

vs.
FAR WEST CAPITAL, INC., a Utah
corporation; STEAMBOAT DEVELOPMENT

JUDGE

fi^oVl \ i r\C\

CORP., a Nevada corporation,
Defendants
Plaintiff complains of defendants in five (5) joint or alternative causes of action in breach
of contract (written agreement), breach of contract (oral agreement), quasi-contract, quantum
meruit, and wrongful inducement(fraud), and alleges as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Nevada, with its
headquarters and primary operations based in Reno, Nevada.

2.

Plaintiffs share holders were Ronald P. Baldwin, James B. Combs, and Ronald E.
Baldwin during all relevant times pertaining to the allegations of this complaint. Plaintiff
was organized for the purpose of entering into the transaction described herein.

3.

The shareholders possessed unique skills necessary to the transaction entered into between
the parties, in that Ronald P. Baldwin was and is a certified public accountant with
specialized tax training with a preeminent world-wide CPA firm and twenty years of

experience in management of a geothermal company, James B. Combs is a geologist and
doctoral graduate who has chaired numerous professional trade and research organizations
in the geothermal power industry and has extensive management and consulting
experience in the geothermal power industry, and Ronald E. Baldwin is an attorney-at-law
licensed in Utah and California with extensive practice experience in securities and
transactional law.
4.

Defendant Far West Capital, Inc. ("Far West"), is a corporation organized under the laws

of the State of Utah, with its headquarters and primary operations based in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Based on information and belief, Far West Capital, Inc. is owned or controlled by Alan O.
Melchior, Thomas Quinn, and Ronald Burch.
5.

Defendant Steamboat Development Corp. is a corporation organized under the laws of the

State of Nevada, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Far West Capital, Inc., with its headquarters
based in Salt Lake City, Utah.
6.

At all times relevant to the matters alleged in this complaint, Defendants were the agents

of each other in committing the acts alleged herein.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

7.

Defendants own and operate a geothermal resource project near Reno, Nevada. This

project is part of the Steamboat Known Geothermal Resource Area, or KGRA, as designated by
the Bureau of Land Management. Specific portions of the operation are owned or conducted
through various subsidiaries, or related controlled entities, of defendants.

The geothermal

resource itself is leased by defendantsfromthree landowners.
8.

Defendants' portion of the Steamboat KGRA currently has four separate operating power

plants, designated as Steamboat L, Steamboat 1A, Steamboat II, and Steamboat HI. Steamboat I
and 1A are structurally conjoined and are typically referred to in combination as Steamboat I &
1 A. Steamboat II and in are strupturally conjoined and are typically referred to in combination as
S^amboat n & HI. The power plants use an advanced production methodology known as a
Darro
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binary system, which essentially consists of raising the geothermalfluidsform underground, using
thesefluidsto superheat an independent Pentane gas conduit, using the superheated Pentane gas
to run the electricity turbines, then cooling the Pentane gas and recycling it again.

The

geothermal fluids are reinjected into the underground reservoir after use in heating the Pentane
gas.
9.

The geothermal resources leased by defendants are believed to be sufficient to support

construction and development of additional geothermal resource and power plant facilities.
10.

Steamboat II & HI is rated at a combined 28.5 Megawatt electricity production facility,

although based on information and belief actual electrical power production has consistently
exceeded the facilities' rating. Plaintiffs' contract with defendants regarding the Steamboat II &
in facility is the crux of this complaint.
11.

On or about August 14, 1994, Defendant Far West, by and through its then-president and

principal officer, Alan O. Melchior, entered into a written Letter of Intent which contained the
outline for a financing arrangement under which plaintiff would acquire afifty-percent(50%)
interest in Steamboat II & IE, andrightsto acquire further interests in the other Steamboat Hills
geothermal projects owned by defendants, in exchange for arrangingfinancingfor defendants in
the amount of Four Million Dollars ($4,000,000.00). A true and correct copy of thisfirstwritten
Letter of Intent executed by both parties is attached hereto as Exhibit A and made a part hereof
(hereinafter the 'Tirst Letter of Intent").
12.

It was the mutual intent of the parties that the First Letter of Intent was to be construed as

a binding commitment to complete a transaction within the general terms set out therein (e.g., the
parties committed to "...execute such further definitive agreements as necessary to carry out the
terms of this Agreement, but the parties specifically agree that no other material matters remain
beyond those set out in this Agreement (emphasis added)..." in paragraph 13 of Exhibit A).
13.

A minor modification extending time for performance dated October 26, 1994, was

directed to extend the time for performance of the First Letter of Intent, Exhibit A; a true and
correct copy of this modification is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

14.

On February 3, 1995, the last written modification of the Letters of Intent was executed

by Far West. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit C. This
modification included the following terms as modified through negotiations with an investment
banker and an investor arranged by plaintiff, all of which had been regularly communicated to
defendants at the time:
a. the second preamble paragraph changes "limited partnership" for 'limited liability
company;"
b. numbered paragraph 1 therein discusses a $5,000,000 capital contribution, which,
when read in conjunction with the Additional Rent purchase in paragraph 4, which Ronald
Burch (Chief Executive Officer of Far West) personally had opined could be acquired for
$1,000,000, is reduced to the $4,000,000 capital contribution actually tendered by plaintiff
in June of 1995;
c. numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 address management responsibilities between the parties,
and the division of related fees.
d. paragraph 5 subordinates Far West's share of cash flows to plaintiffs financing.
e. other terms indicate an option for defendants to acquire plaintiffs rights to acquire the
related Steamboat I and 1A facilities in the event another investor was found by
defendants, indicating defendants' agreement that plaintiff had already acquired
enforceable contract rights under the Letters of Intent (which facilities were later sold
without consent of plaintiff.); and
f. the date for performance was extended until July 31,1995.
15.

On May 25, 1995, plaintiffs legal counsel, Winston & Strawn of New York City,

delivered to defendants the Confidential Private Placement Memorandum of the same date
(hereinafter the "Offering Memorandum"), a true and correct copy of Volume I of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit D. (The memorandum is in two volumes, the second of which only
contains several hundred pages of public disclosure information about Sierra Pacific Resources,
the Nevada utility which contracted to purchase the electric powerfromthe Steamboat facilities).
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This document, in 115 pages excluding exhibits,finalizedall remaining details between the parties
with minute particularity.
16.

On multiple occasions following March 25, 1995, Far West's Chief Executive Officer

affirmed to plaintiffs Chief Executive Officer that all terms were acceptable and in accordance
with the requirements under the Letters of Intent, and had been reviewed and agreed to by the
directors of defendants. Plaintiffs were prepared to perform, and did tender performance, of all
acts as specified in Exhibit D anytime on or after May 25,1995. Thus, plaintiff tendered complete
performance under the contract well in advance of July 31, 1995, the date specified in the third of
the Letters of Intent (Exhibit C).
17.

During the next several weeks after May 25, 1995 plaintiff and its legal counsel attempted

to have defendants execute several documents required to complete the financing, such as the
partnership agreement, subordination agreement, security instruments, and documents of title, all
in accordance with the Offering Memorandum (Exhibit D), but were unable to secure defendants'
cooperation infinalizingthese ministerial acts.
18.

However, at no time were any specific terms contained in the Offering Memorandum

(Exhibit D) objected to or otherwise indicated by defendants as requiring further refinement or
revision.
19.

After multiple telephone calls and meetings which failed to disclose any reason for

defendants' delays, a meeting for July 1, 1995, was arranged between two of the principal
shareholders, officers and directors of plaintiff (Ronald E. Baldwin and Ronald P. Baldwin) and
two of the principal shareholders, officers and directors of defendants (Alan O. Melchior and
Thomas Quinn).
20.

At this meeting, the parties extensively discussed the following terms recited in the

Offering Memorandum;
a. a misunderstanding by defendants of certain payment terms and the tax implications
thereof;
b. the mechanics of the subordination agreement;
c. the timeliness of the closing date for the transaction; and
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d. whether defendants would incur substantial legal and associated closing costs.
Although defendants expressed concerns seemed to have been resolved, defendants then stated
that they would continue to review the documentation and contact plaintiffs after the July 4
weekend, as also referenced in a letterfromplaintiffs investment banker, Martin Smiley of CIBCWood Gundy, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
21.

Plaintiffs' representatives left the meeting with the impression that all issues were

satisfactorily resolved, according to defendants' own statements at the meeting.

This was

because:
a. the payment and tax implications remained exactly as agreed from the initial letter of
intent in August of 1994 (Exhibit A), asfollyexplained by Ronald P. Baldwin, a CPA and
tax expert.
b. the subordination agreement was exactly as agreed by defendants in the third Letter of
Intent (Exhibit C), was a requirement of the investor, and plaintiffs had further offered the
accommodation that in the unlikely event that cash flows fell below the amount contained
in defendants' own projections, such that the subordination was called upon, then plaintiff
would repay any such amounts to defendants out of future cash flows;
c. plaintiffs legal counsel had assured defendants by telephone only a few days before the
meeting that all documentation could still be completed before July 18, 1995, with
defendants' cooperation, and plaintiffs further assured defendants that they were prepared
to close the transaction well before the July 31 deadline recited in the third Letter of Intent
(Exhibit C); and
d. as a further accommodation, plaintiffs representatives agreed to reimburse any
reasonable closing costs, up to $300,000.00, out of plaintiffsfinancingproceeds, and to
provide a letter of credit to this effect.
Thus, it appeared that defendants could not possibly have any reasonable concerns regarding the
transaction.
22.

On July 5, 1995, defendants first proclaimed their anticipatory repudiation of the

agreement by telephone call from Alan O. Melchior to Ronald P. Baldwin. The grounds for the
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repudiation were only that the projects were performing better than expected so defendants no
longer needed any financing, and more importantly, that defendants wanted more money than
originally agreed.
23.

During the ensuing months, plaintiff attempted contact with defendants for further

negotiations to resolve the problems, both regarding the proposed transaction and a larger
transaction contemplating the outright sale of the entire Steamboat II and DI facilities, but the
anticipatory breach by defendants occurred on or about July 5, 1995. All further negotiations
after this date constituted nothing more than a business decision to accommodate defendants, if
possible, to complete the transaction and mitigate damages.
24.

Ongoing discussions included another proposal to purchase the entire Steamboat II & DI

facility, and many other accommodations suggested by plaintiffs. After many more months of
work and reanalyzing the project to come up with new financing structures, defendants again
withdrew form discussions without explanation for many months. Finally, after several calls to
defendants' offices, Tom Quinn advised Ronald E. Baldwin by telephone that defendants could no
longer discuss any form of sale of the facilities because Alan O. Melchior was being sued for
divorce.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
BREACH OF CONTRACT (WRITTEN AGREEMENT)

25.

The written documentation, particularly Exhibits A through D attached hereto, evidences

the mutual assent of the parties to the contract described therein. Although the transaction was
obviously very complicated, all material terms are described with sufficient specificity so that a
reasonable person could readily determine the respective rights and duties of the parties.
26.

The contract was breached by the defendants' repudiation by Alan 0. Melchior's

telephone communication to Ronald P. Baldwin on or about July 5, 1995.
27.

The breach of the contract proximately caused extensive damages to plaintiff, consisting of

the lost profits and distributions of interest and dividends to its investor contemplated under the
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Offering Memorandum at Exhibit D. These amounts were derived from projections for the
Steamboat II & HI facilities provided directly from defendants.
28.

Plaintiff calculates that its lost profits from defendants' breach of contract, including

amounts which would have been distributed to its investor, Kentucky Utility, pursuant to the
Offering Memorandum, amount to approximately $21,700,000.00.

Related attorney's fees,

investment banker's fees (Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce - CDBC Wood Gundy), and
expenses of Kentucky Utility (which actively participated in the development of the financing
arrangement, devoting hundreds of hours of key personnel), and plaintiff constitute additional
damages, according to proof.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
ALTERNATIVE BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM (ORAL AGREEMENT)

29.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 24, above.

30.

Defendant Far West, through its corporate Chief Executive Officer, Ronald Burch, who

was designated throughout dealings as the representative of Far West, engaged in several
ostensibly authorized communications with Dr. James B. Combs, the Chief Executive Officer and
authorized agent of plaintiff, commencing in early June of 1995, and regarding the terms specified
in complete detail in the Offering Memorandum at Exhibit D. On multiple occasions, including
several conversations with other witnesses present, Ronald Burch affirmed that Far West was in
agreement and accepted the terms for the acquisition and other terms as described in the Offering
Memorandum. Similar and consistent statements were made to plaintiffs investment banker and
investor on multiple occasions.
31.

The defendants' agreement to the written documentation, particularly Exhibit D attached

hereto, evidences the mutual assent of the parties to the contract described therein. Although the
transaction was obviously very complicated, all material terms are described with sufficient
specificity so that a reasonable person could readily determine the respective rights and duties of
the parties.
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32.

The contract was breached by the defendants' repudiation by Alan O. Melchior's

telephone communication to Ronald P. Baldwin on or about July 5,1995.
33.

The breach of the contract proximately caused extensive damages to plaintiff, consisting of

the lost profits and distributions of interest and dividends to its investor contemplated under the
Oflfering Memorandum at Exhibit D. These amounts were derived from projections for the
Steamboat II & EI facilities provided directly from defendants.
34.

Plaintiff calculates that its lost profits from defendants' breach of contract, including

amounts which would have been distributed to its investor, Kentucky Utility, pursuant to the
Oflfering Memorandum, amount to approximately $21,700,000.00.

Related attorney's fees,

investment banker's fees (Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce - CIBC Wood Gundy), and
expenses of Kentucky Utility (which actively participated in the development of the financing
arrangement, devoting hundreds of hours of key personnel), and plaintiff constitute additional
damages, according to proof.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
ALTERNATIVE CLAIM IN QUASI-CONTRACT

35.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 24, above.

36.

Defendants actions and representations as described above were intended by defendants to

induce plaintiff to believe that documents completing the acquisition described in the Oflfering
Memorandum were to be finalized within a few weeks following the date of the Oflfering
Memorandum. Defendants knew, or should have known, of the extensive amount of time and
expense being devoted by plaintiffs personnel and advisors in order to arrange the financing
requested by defendants, as evidenced by the letters of intent dating back to August of 1994.
37.

Plaintiff did believe defendants' actions and representations and proceeded to tender

performance as described in the Oflfering Memorandum in detrimental reliance upon those actions
and representations, and plaintiffs belief was reasonable under all the circumstances.
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38.

Accordingly, equity demands that defendants cannot deny the existence of the contract

now, and should be held responsible to perform the obligations under the contract or pay
restitution to plaintiff.
39.

Restitution under the present circumstances should be commensurate with the damages

caused by an ordinary breach of contract, in that the contract was of sufficient certainty to
determine these damages.
40.

PlaintiflF calculates that its lost profits from defendants' breach of contract, including

amounts which would have been distributed to its investor, Kentucky Utility, pursuant to the
Offering Memorandum, amount to approximately $21,700,000.00.

Related attorney's fees,

investment banker's fees (Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce - CIBC Wood Gundy), and
expenses of Kentucky Utility (which actively participated in the development of the financing
arrangement, devoting hundreds of hours of key personnel), and plaintiff constitute additional
restitution damages, according to proof.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
ALTERNATIVE COMPLAINT FOR
COMPENSATION IN QUANTUM MERUIT

41.

PlaintiflF realleges paragraphs 1 through 24, and 36 through 38, above.

42.

Defendants, through their respective officers, knowingly and with malice aforethought,

wrongfully induced plaintiff to provide the services of its officers and directors, and outside
consultants and attorneys, under an understanding that plaintiff would be compensated in
proportion to the economic benefits derived, and anticipated profits therefrom, while in fact never
intending to pay plaintiff the value of these services.
43.

Plaintiff undertook the engagement as requested by defendants, with the reasonable

expectation of compensation commensurate with the benefits derived, and anticipated profits
therefrom.
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44.

Therefore, on the basis of defendants' wholly unjustified repudiation and breach of the

agreements described above, plaintiff alleges that in the alternative (or cumulative) to defendants'
performance under the contract as specified in the OflFering Memorandum, plaintiff is entitled to
fair and reasonable compensation for services based on quantum meruit.
45.

The fair and reasonable value of the benefits received by defendants from plaintiffs

services is at least $2,500,000.00, in accordance with the fees incurred by plaintiffs legal counsel,
accountants, investment bank, investor's personnel, and related advisors, plus the fair value of the
time expended by officers and directors of plaintiff, all of which shall be subject to proof

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
ALTERNATIVE COMPLAINT FOR
WRONGFUL INDUCEMENT (FRAUD)

46.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 24, and 36 through 38, above.2

47.

Defendants' conduct and representations, as set forth above, were egregiously wanton,

malicious, oppressive, and intended to fraudulently induce plaintiff to incur the substantial
expenses which were, in fact, incurred by plaintiff, without any apparent intention to live up to
defendants' many promises, for purposes which are not entirely clear to plaintiff, but probably
benefited defendants in negotiations with other parties or created other unknown opportunities for
defendants, or facilitated false and malicious representations in other proceedings affecting the
principals of defendants.
48.

Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendants' representations and conduct to its detriment.

49.

The fair and reasonable value of the benefits received by defendants from plaintiffs services

is at least $2,500,000.00, in accordance with the fees incurred by plaintiffs legal counsel,
accountants, investment bank, investor's personnel, and related advisors, plus the fair value of the
tiyrie expended by officers and directors of plaintiff, all of which shall be subject to proof. In
adaititm to institution for the fair value of these stervices fraudulently obtained by defendants,
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plaintiff submits that defendants misconduct rises to the level that exemplary or punitive damages
are called for under the circumstances in an amount to be proven at trial.

\\\
\\\
\\\

WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for judgment against defendants, and each of them, in
accordance with proof and the following estimates as set out by cause of action numbered above:
A. First Cause of Action:

Damages of $21,700,000.00;

B. Second Cause of Action:

Damages of $21,700,000.00;

C. Third Cause of Action:

Restitution of $21,700,000.00;

D. Fourth Cause of Action:

Restitution of $2,500,000.00;

E. Fifth Cause of Action:

Restitution of $2,500,000.00, and exemplary and punitive

damages for the egregiously wanton, malicious, and oppressive conduct of defendants in an
amount to be determined at trial;

and that plaintiff be awarded costs and attorney's fees incurred to bring this action as provided for
by the contract.
F.

Plaintiff respectfully demands a jury trial.

DATED this^t^ day of July, 1999.

Ichael L. Labertew
Law Offices of Michael L. Labertew
4685 Highland Avenue, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
(801)363-3555

Oarro

1 *>

COVER SHEET FOR CIVIL ACTIONS
PARTY IDENTIFICATION (ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

ATTY FOR PLAINUFF/PETITIONER
Name t\{£ l\ * ElL.
i$fe#T!=J
Address
ty±$T)4/i/iiM
4K - a ^ e ^

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER
Name Y'ffc

CB^T^>

Address j (2-"7

t ^ ^ i

£-

(7 Jo

C<*.
£zz .

sic,
Day Time Telephone

or

f*>;j

Day Time Telephone

[fa 0 1 {$^

3<rrr

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER
Name
Address

ATTY FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER
Name
Address

Day Time Telephone

Day Time Telephone

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
.
ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
]r L )A,c
Name j^H
^ S / T Cn^ ^ > Name
Address ^ /
E%FcUT\j£
/ ^ / T Of. Address
SlC,
UT
Day Time Telephone

£<f/JJ

^

F

Day Time Telephone

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
r
Name ITE/M fo*T te VBw-P ^^' 6*£ Name
Address To *^ J-» B£ATY
$ ~>~, Address

*£*a , W

tiro)

*is~°

Day Time Telephone

Day Time Telephone

TOTAL CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
$

2-f , 7 a Q

JURY DEMAND

tar Yes

}£>OQ.—

• No

SCHEDULE OF FEES: §21 -1 -5. CHECK ANY THAT APPLY. (SEE CASE TYPES FOR
FILING FEES FOR COMPLAINTS OTHER THAN CLAIM FOR DAMAGES)

•

•

•
•

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES —
Civil, Interpleader
$37
$2000 or less
Civil or Interpleader: $2001 $9999
Civil or Interpleader: $10,000
and over

Civil Unspecified
MISCELLANEOUS
QT Jury Demand
^ ^
^ ^
Q
yM

$120
$50
$2

$80
$120

w

TabB

THE GEOTHL MAL COMPANY
August 10, 1994
Mr. Alan 0. Melchior
President
Far West Capital, Inc.
921 Executive Park Drive, Suite B
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

Re:

Letter of Intent - Shared Management and Acquisition of Interests in
Existing and Future Geothermal Power Projects.

Dear Alan:
This letter of intent sets out the principal terms of an agreement ("Agreement")
with respect to the above-referenced matter, between The Geothermal Company
(ttTGCn), a Nevada corporation with offices located at 1589 South 1600 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84105, and Far West Capital, Inc. fFWC"), a Utah
corporation with its principal offices located at 921 Executive Drive, Suite B, Salt
Lake City, 84117. To the extent that other affiliates (subsidiaries or controlled
partnerships) of FWC are necessary parties to the transactions described below,
FWC shall act on behalf of those affiliates by executing this Agreement.

Executive Summary
2^S

:

TGC proposes to acquire a fifty-percent (50%) joint venture interest in the
Steamboat II and III power plants and the related assets (meaning all the plant,
equipment, real property, well field, easements of ingress/egress, geothermal
resources, and associated rights dedicated to the plant and equipment, all as
described in the sale and leaseback agreement between Steamboat
Development Corporation ("SDC"), a subsidiary of FWC, and General Electric
Capital Corporation fGECC*)) dedicated to these projects (collectively "SB II &
III") through a newly-formed limited liability company ("LLC"), in exchange for a
capital contribution to the LLC in an amount which will be determined based
upon certain factors described below, but which is estimated to be approximately
Four Million Dollars ($4,000,000). The other fifty-percent (50%) of LLC shall be
owned by SDC.
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TGC also proposes to acquire all of the assets and liabilities of 1-A Enterprises
Partnership, a Nevada general partnership p-A") and Far West Electric Energy
Fund, LP., a Delaware limited partnership ("Fund") through a limited liability
company wholly-owned by TGC. " t h e acquisition of the Fund will be
accomplished by means of a roll-up transaction, wherein FWC will exchange its
general partnership interest and the limited partners will exchange their limited
partnership units for shares in TGC (or possibly cash) on terms subject to a
fairness opinion letter and acceptable to the limited partners. (1-A, Fund and
LLC are collectively referred to herein as the "Projects").
TGC shall participate on a joint executive control basis in all management
aspects of LLC and shall have primary responsibility for the accounting, tax, and
other financial records and reports of the LLC. TGC also proposes to acquire
rights of first negotiation with FWC (or its affiliates) to provide debt and equity
financing in exchange for a fifty percent (50%) interest in each future geothermal
power project undertaken by FWC or its affiliates.
TGC intends to obtain the funds for the preceding transactions by means of a
two-stage offering. The first stage will be to raise sufficient funds to provide the
Loan (a defined term - see paragraph A below) and working capital for TGC
pursuant to a private placement to accredited investors under Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") Regulation D, Rule 506, wherein the securities
shall consist of convertible notes of TGC secured by all of the assets of TGC, to
be marketed through a network of broker-dealers in the United States and
Germany. The second stage will involve taking TGC public via an initial public
offering to raise up to Eight Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($8,500,000)
pursuant to an SEC registration under the 1933 Act.
TGC is a newly-formed private corporation owned forty-percent (40%) by Dr.
James B. Combs, forty-percent (40%) by The Baldwin Family Trust, and twentypercent (20%) by Ronald E. Baldwin.
As a general overview of the methodology, the transaction is proposed to
proceed as follows:
A.
TGC will acquire an option from FWC to obtain the interests and rights
described above for arranging a One Million Dollar ($1,000,000) loan to FWC
(the "Loan").
B.
FWC will assist TGC in arranging the Loan by making available to TGC
copies of FWC's and SDC's current financial statements, workpapers, asset
descriptions, proof of title, lender correspondence, and related data as
reasonably requested by TGC and approved as necessary by GECC.
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C.
Neither FWC nor TGC shall have any obligation to proceed with this
Agreement, nor any transaction described herein, until TGC provides proof,
satisfactory to FWC, that TGC is ready, willing and able to proceed with the
Loan on the terms and conditions described in paragraph 1 below, which must
occur on or before December 1,1994.
D.
When TGC establishes its ability to proceed with the Loan pursuant to the
preceding paragraph C, both FWC and TGC shall complete the following
documentation to be placed in escrow as a condition of closing the Loan:
•

an executed mutually acceptable option agreement regarding SB II &
III, in material form and substance as the Option described in this
Agreement, especially in paragraph 4 below;

•

a letter from Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse"), in
form reasonably acceptable to TGC, which acknowledges
Westinghouse's awareness of the proposed acquisition by TGC of an
interest in the Fund and 1-A, and interposing no objections to TGC's
investigating and pursuing that transaction;

•

a letter from GECC, in form reasonably acceptable to TGC, which
acknowledges GECC's awareness of the proposed acquisition by TGC
of an interest in SB II & III, and interposing no objections to TGC's
investigating and pursuing that transaction; and

•

a letter from FWC committing its best efforts, consistent with FWC's
fiduciary obligations to the affiliated entities (including the Fund and its
limited partners), to cooperate with TGC and to assist in completing
the transactions involving the Fund proposed under this Agreement.

The completion of the preceding documentation between the parties shall be
commenced as soon as possible, in order that no ambiguities or
misunderstandings shall forestall the escrow or the completion of all the
transactions described in this Agreement; nevertheless FWC shall not be
required to actually deposit any documents into escrow until TGC tenders
performance of its Loan obligations as set out in this Agreement.

Material Terms Of Proposal
1.
All obligations of FWC shall be contingent upon TGC providing the Loan
on the following terms:
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(i)

$1,000,000 principal balance;

(ii)

Ready funds available to FWC not later than December 1, 1994;

(iii)

Interest rate of fifteen-percent (15%), without any other points, loan
fees, or loan costs;

(iv) Principal and interest due upon the earlier of one (1) year from the
closing date of the Loan, or exercise of the Option by TGC (whereupon
the Loan balance shall be credited to the exercise price of the Option),
provided further that if TGC notifies FWC that it will not exercise the
Option for any reason, or after the expiration of the Option, whichever
occurs first, FWC shall have ten (10) days after such notice or
expiration date to elect to convert the Loan term to two (2) years,
payable in twenty-four (24) equal monthly installments commencing
thirty days after such election by FWC, fully amortizing the Loan at the
same fifteen-percent (15%) interest rate;
(v)

The Loan shall be a general obligation of FWC and secured by the
equity cash flow of SDC and all other assets of FWC;

(vi)

Before closing the Loan, the parties shall deposit into escrow the
documentation described in paragraph D of the Executive Summary
above; and

(vii) In the event that TGC fails to close the Loan on or before December 1,
1994, this Agreement shall be null and void, and the parties shall each
bear their own costs (including accountant's, consultant's and attorney's
fees) incurred with respect to this Agreement, without any liability or
further obligation to each other.
2.
In partial consideration for TGC's funding of the Loan, and contingent
upon the prior funding of the Loan in accordance with paragraph 1 above and
successful approval of the roll-up of the Fund in accordance with paragraph 3
below, and only after TGC meets these conditions precedent, FWC shall
sublease the geothermal mineral rights and convey all of the power plants and
the related assets (meaning all the plant, equipment, real property, well field,
easements of ingress/egress, geothermal resources, and associated rights
dedicated to the plant and equipment, all as described in the financing
agreement between Fund, 1-A, and Westinghouse), and liabilities of 1-A and the
Fund to TGC's designated limited liability company as soon as possible after
demand for conveyance from TGC. As long as the Loan is outstanding, FWC
shall not transfer the preceding interests before TGC has fulfilled the obligations
set out in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Agreement and made demand for
conveyance upon FWC, nor any later than thirty (30) days following TGC's
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demand for conveyance. Prior to such conveyance, a roll-up of the Fund (as
described in paragraph 3 below) must be approved in accordance with the
limited partner's rights. The parties will ^cooperate with each other to obtain the
consent of the limited partners of the Fund to the roll-up, wherein TGC shall be
responsible for the legal expenses and costs of disseminating any proxies
required for a vote of the limited partners. The Fund will have sold the Crystal
Springs Hydroelectric Company before the conveyance date, and such sale is
specifically exempt from the prohibitions of paragraph 8 below. As previously
noted, the parties will cooperate to obtain the consent of Westinghouse to the
proposed TGC ownership interests in the Fund and 1-A Projects. The parties
shall use their best efforts to ensure that all defaults under the Westinghouse
loan agreements are eliminated or waived. Prior to the proposed roll-up, and as
a component of the proposal to the limited partners of the Fund, FWC will
cooperate with TGC in negotiations with Westinghouse to refinance the present
approximate total Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollar ($7,500,000)
loans to the Fund and 1-A. The exact terms and conditions of any debt
restructuring shall be at the discretion of TGC and Westinghouse.
3.
To the extent permissible in connection with FWC's fiduciary and other
legal obligations, FWC will cooperate with TGC in soliciting all the limited
partners of the Fund to exchange their interests for common shock of TGC in a
roll-up proxy transaction in compliance with the applicable SEC, NASD, and
state "Blue Sky" laws governing such matters. All legal and related costs of the
proposed Toll-up shall be at TGC's expense, including any required fairness or
tax opinion letters. The roll-up must be completed within one (1) year of closing
the Loan. TGC will offer the limited partners several options regarding their rollup of the limited partnership interests, ranging from a cash buy out to shares of
TGC common stock. The full TGC business plan will be described to the limited
partners in the roll-up proxies. TGC shall be entitled to acquire the Fund and 1A as described in paragraph 2 above only upon successfully obtaining approval
of the limited partners of the Fund in accordance with this provision; however, all
other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect regardless
of the outcome of the proposed roll-up.
4.
In further consideration for TGC's funding of the Loan, and contingent
upon the prior funding of the Loan in accordance with paragraph 1 above, FWC
will grant TGC the Option to acquire the fifty-percent interest in SB II & 111 for
approximately ($4,000,000), an amount which may vary as described below,
expiring one (1) year from the closing date of the Loan. The Option shall
operate as follows:
(i)

Within fifteen (15) days after FWC receives notification from TGC that
TGC is prepared to exercise the Option, and effective as of the closing
date, FWC will deposit into escrow all SB II & III project assets (except
for an amount of project cash and receivables equal to TGC's capital
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contribution described in paragraph 4(ii) below), and liabilities,
including the approximately Two Million Dollar ($2,000,000) loan from
TIC-The Industrial Company, all still subject to the GECC lease, into a
new LLC to be formed under'the laws of the State of Nevada. The
parties shall use their best efforts to ensure that all defaults under the
GECC lease are eliminated or waived;
(ii)

In a closing to take place on the fifteenth day following TGC's notice to
FWC of TGC's intent to exercise the Option, TGC shall contribute
approximately Four Million Dollars ($4,000,000) into the LLC in
exchange for TGC's fifty-percent (50%) ownership interest in the LLC,
wherein the actual amount of the capital contribution shall be adjusted
in accordance with the further mutual agreement of the parties based
on factors affecting the market for TGC's initial public offering. In this
regard, the basic formula shall be determined based on the
price/earnings ratio resulting from TGC's acquisition of the fifty-percent
(50%) interest in the assets of SB II & III as described in paragraph 4(i)
above. The parties note that the objective is for TGC to qualify as soon
as possible for National Market System status on the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System, with an
opening underwriting priced at Ten Dollars ($10) per share of common
stock; and

(iii)

FWC shall repay the Loan at the closing.

5.
Contingent upon TGC's exercise of the Option in accordance with
paragraph 4 above, FWC will grant TGC a further right of first negotiation to
arrange the funding for all of FWC's future geothermal projects. The right of first
negotiation shall require at least thirty (30) days prior notice from FWC to TGC
of each proposed new project finance, where the thirty (30) days notice shall
commence no sooner than after a power sale contract has been negotiated and
approved for such project, whereupon TGC shall (if TGC elects to undertake the
financing) have sixty (60) days to present a term sheet for the financing
acceptable to FWC; thereafter, FWC shall allow a reasonable time to complete
the financing. TGC will acquire a 50% equity interest in each project in
exchange for arranging the debt and equity funding on the terms as set out on
the term sheet acceptable to FWC described in the preceding sentence. TGC
will have the same relationship in each new project as described above for the
SB II & 111 LLC, except that all available depreciation and tax credits shall be
allocated to TGC. In the event that TGC fails to raise the required funds for the
project within the time frame set out in this paragraph, the parties shall each
bear their own costs incurred with respect to such attempted financing
arrangements, without any liability or further obligation to each other.
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6.
TGC will perform all accounting, tax and other financial services for each
of the LLCs described in this Agreement (present and future) and will be
responsible for dealing with GECC^ Westinghouse, and any future project
lenders on all matters related to the~project loans. TGC shall be entitled to
receive a reasonable share of administration fees for such services payable
under the project financing agreements.
7.
S.B. GEO, INC. shall continue as operator of the Projects under the
Operation and Maintenance Agreements currently in effect. TGC shall have the
power to appoint representatives to the operating committees for all operating
matters (including approval of operating budgets) as provided in the Operation
and Maintenance Agreements; however, the parties shall have joint executive
control over the Projects, meaning that each has an equal vote, and changes to
any operational policy shall require unanimous agreement, or shall not be
revised.
8.
As long as the Loan is outstanding, FWC shall not transfer, sell, assign,
nor distribute any of the assets of any of the Projects in any manner prior to
completion of this Agreement, or the expiration of this Agreement. As long as
the Loan is outstanding, FWC shall not incur any new liabilities (except those in
the ordinary course of business) with respect to the Projects prior to completion
of this Agreement, or the expiration of this Agreement. FWC shall continue
operation of the Projects in substantially the same manner as at present.
9.
Immediately after execution of this Agreement by FWC, TGC shall
commence its due diligence investigation of FWC and affiliates regarding any
and all matters affecting the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. The
due diligence investigation shall be completed within fifteen (15) days from the
date of execution of this Agreement by FWC. FWC shall provide all financial
and corporate information, including the audit reports and workpapers; copies of
all relevant contracts; copies of all documents evidencing ownership of
geothermal resource rights, and other assets material to the Projects; and any
other documents or information that TGC may reasonably require to carry out its
due diligence investigation, subject to GECC's consent to such disclosure. TGC
shall bear its own costs of accountants, attorneys, consultants, or other persons
that TGC shall deem necessary to engage for purposes of the due diligence
investigation. TGC and all persons involved in the due diligence investigation
shall execute reasonable confidentiality agreements regarding the information
provided by FWC, if requested by FWC. If TGC's due diligence investigation
discloses any matters which, in TGC's sole discretionary opinion, prevent or
unduly impede the feasibility of the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement, TGC shall notify FWC of such matters. If such matters cannot be
corrected to the satisfaction of TGC within ten (10) days, then this Agreement
shall become null and void, and each party shall bear its own costs (including
fees of professionals), without any further obligation or liability to the other party.
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Nothing herein shall absolve FWC of its obligation to disclose any and all
matters which may be material to the transactions contemplated herein.
10.
The parties warranty to each other that entering into this Agreement, and
the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, shall not be a violation of any
material contracts pertaining to the matters set out in this Agreement, and 'that
execution of this Agreement, and such further documents as shall be necessary
to carry out the terms of this Agreement, will be duly authorized and in
accordance with the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or other governing
documents of the respective parties.
11.
The parties agree that FWC shall not circumvent TGC's efforts to obtain
funding for the Loan. In this regard, unless prior written consent is obtained from
TGC, FWC shall not negotiate with, nor enter into any agreement with, any thirdparty sources of funding which are first introduced to FWC by TGC, or
previously contacted by TGC for purposes of funding the Loan, for a period of
six (6) months following the execution of this Agreement. TGC shall provide
prior written notice to FWC of any third-parties which TGC has contacted for
purposes of funding the Loan.
12.
This Agreement, and such further documents as shall be necessary to
carry out the terms of this Agreement, shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Utah. In the event of any dispute between the parties, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover its costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection
with such dispute. Venue for litigation shall reside with the Federal Courts
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, or in the event that the Federal Courts shall lack
jurisdiction for any reason, then in the State Courts located in Salt Lake City,
Utah.
13.
By signing below, the parties commit to this Agreement subject only to the
contingencies set forth hereia The parties shall execute such further definitive
agreements as necessary to carry out the terms of this Agreement, but the
parties specifically agree that no other material matters remain beyond those set
out in this Agreement.
14.
This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, wherein the collective
signed documents shall constitute one and the same Agreement; furthermore,
each party shall retain an executed original of the final Agreement.

Please signify your acceptance of this Agreement by executing below. Upon
execution of this Agreement by FWC, TGC will authorize its legal counsel to
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commence drafting the definitive contracts regarding the transactions described
above, to commence its due diligence investigation, and to undertake the private
placement documentation and related activities.
Thank you for your
consideration of this proposal and Agreement.
Signed,
THE GEOTHERMAL COMPANY

^^.\W(3>

Date:

^ Y \ ^

Dr. Jantes
Cdpibs
>s B.
B.Cdmbs
Preside

\

*

Agreed and Accepted:
FAR WEST CAPITAL, INC.

w

M r Alan 0. Melchior,
President
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THE GEOTHERL- L COMPANY
February 3,1995
Mr. Ron Burch
Vice President
Far West Capital, Inc.
921 Executive Park Drive, Suite B
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
RE:

Second Modification of Letter of Intent Dated August 10,1994
as Modified October 26,1994

Dear Ron:
This letter will serve to confirm and formalize our verbal discussions and
understanding. Far West Capital, Inc. ("FWC") and The Geothermal Company
("TGCo") entered into the Letter of Intent dated August 10,1994 as modified October
26, 1994 (the "Lol") wherein FWC agreed to grant TGCo rights and options, under
terms defined in the Lol, to acquire a fifty-percent (50%) joint venture interest in the
Steamboat II and HI power plants and the related assets ("the Project") and to acquire
all the assets and liabilities of 1-A Enterprises Partnership and Far West Electric
Energy Fund, L.P. These rights and options, as well as others enumerated in the Lol
but not reiterated in this letter, were to be granted to TGCo contingent on TGCo
arranging a one million dollar ($1,000,000) loan (the "Loan") to FWC under terms as
described in the Lol.
FWC and TGCo hereby agree to further modify the Lol by reducing the Loan
requirement to three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) and continuing the
acquisition rights and options as defined in the Lol, revised in accordance with this
Lol Second Modification Agreement (the "Revision") contingent on TGCo
providing the three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) loan and a written
commitment to fund its capital contribution to a newly-formed Nevada limited
liability company or a limited partnership entity (herein, the "LLC") established to
acquire the Project. All of the definitions and descriptions of the participating parties
to this Revision not otherwise defined herein, are the same as defined in the Lol
(with the exception that "SDC" as defined in the Lol is the same entity as
"Steamboat" used in the other documents referred to herein).
Accordingly, the parties mutually acknowledge and the parties mutually
agree to modify the Lol as follows:
1.
TGCo will acquire an option to obtain the interest and rights described
in the Lol when it has provided a three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) loan to
FWC (the "Loan") and shall, within forty-five (45) days following receipt by TGCo of
a letter from General Electric Capital Corporation ("GE Capital") consenting to the
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release of the Project sale and leaseback documents to potential investors of TGCo,
obtain a written commitment for a project financing for the funding required to
make the capital contribution, up to a maximum of five million dollars ($5,000,000),
to the LLC as provided in Paragraph 4 of the Lol, including the purchase of the 22%
equity interest of GE Capital in SB II and III.
2.
FWC hereby agrees that TGCo, or its designee acceptable to FWC,
subject to the approval of GE Capital and the negotiation of a mutually acceptable
Operating Agreement or similar contractual arrangement, will be the Managing
Member of the LLC and the Project Manager. Therefore, the last sentence of
Paragraph 6 of the Lol is deleted and in lieu thereof, FWC and TGCo hereby agree
that the First Amended and Restated Escrow Agreement among Steamboat
Development Corp. ("Steamboat") and GE Capital, First Interstate Bank of Nevada
and Valley Bank and Trust Company, N.A., dated as of December 31, 1992 (the
"Escrow Agreement")/ will be amended to provide that TGCo, or its designee, will
receive the G&A Monthly Payment Amount and the Support Fee, as defined
therein, after the formation of the LLC and the close of the transaction contemplated
herein.
3.
TGCo hereby acknowledges that FWC, or its designee, is and shall
remain the Operator of the Project. Accordingly, FWC, or its designee, receives the
O&M Fee, the entire Management Fee, and Operator Bonus, as those terms are
defined in the Operation and Maintenance Agreement, amended as of December 31,
1992, payable under the terms of the Escrow Agreement and will continue to receive
such payments after the formation of the LLC. However, subject to the approval of
GE Capital, under Section 3.4 (a) and (c) of the Operation and Maintenance
Agreement, amended as of December 31, 1992, a TGCo representative, or its
designee, will be added to the list of persons entitled to receive reports and to be
consulted, which list includes Steamboat, Steamboat's Representative, GE Capital
and the Independent Technical Consultant (as defined in the Operation and
Maintenance Agreement) to accommodate the joint venture interests of FWC and
TGCo in the LLC and ownership of the Project, after the formation of the LLC and
the close of the transaction contemplated herein.
4.
FWC hereby acknowledges that TGCo has made a tentative offer to
acquire, and agrees that TGCo may acquire on behalf of the LLC, the Additional
Rent, 22% of Distributable Cash interest payable to the Lease Trustee in accordance
with the provisions of Sections 4.1 (v) (1) and 4.1 (w) (1) of the Escrow Agreement.
Upon such acquisition, FWC hereby further agrees that the cash distributions
applicable thereto will be pledged as collateral, provided FWC approves the terms
and conditions of the pledge, for the benefit of the provider of the TGCo project
financing described in paragraph 1 above of this Revision.
5.
FWC hereby agrees that upon formation of the LLC, amounts payable
for the benefit of Steamboat and its equity investors as defined in Sections 4.1 (v) (3)
and 4.1 (w) (3) of the Escrow Agreement will be subordinated in receipt by Steamboat
for the benefit of the provider of the TGCo project financing described in paragraph
1 above of this Revision; provided, the project financing will not have a secured
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interest in the LLC or any project assets other than cash flows received by the LLC
from the Project and provided further that the terms of the project financing are
otherwise acceptable to TGCo, GE Capital and FWC If TGCo uses any of these
subordinated funds of Steamboat to repay interest and/or principal of the TGCo
project financing, TGCo will promptly deliver to Steamboat a note in the amount of
such Steamboat funds used by TGCo secured on the LLC interest owned by TGCo
and payable in 180 days with interest at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum
compounded annually on unpaid principal and interest. If said notes are not repaid
when due, FWC shall immediately become the Managing Member of the LLC and
Project Manager, shall receive all fees associated with those duties, and shall be
entitled to receive 100% of all fees and revenues attributed to TGCo's interest in the
LLC and not utilized to repay the project financing obtained by TGCo until the TGCo
notes to FWC are paid in full. The final terms and conditions of repayment of the
subordinated note to Steamboat, including any security interest granted by TGCo or
to the provider of TGCo project financing, will, of course, be subject to the terms of
the subordination agreement to be entered into with the investors and the consent
of FWC and GE Capital to the transaction.
6.
For a period of time not longer than 45 days following the receipt by TGCo of
a letter from GE Capital consenting to the release of the Project sale and leaseback
documents to potential investors of TGCo, FWC shall have the right to terminate
TGCo's option to acquire the Steamboat 1 and 1A projects by paying TGCo an
amount equal to one hundred fifty fthousand dollars ($150,000) in cash; otherwise,
all rights to acquire ihe Steamboat 1 and 1A projects shall remain with TGCo.
7.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein or in the Letter of
Intent dated August 10, 1994, and its first modification dated October 26, 1994, any
and all commitments, responsibilities and/or obligations which have been set forth
either in writing or verbally are not binding upon either party, except for the
confidentiality agreements dated December 2, 1994 which will remain in full force
for the term as specified in those agreements, until such time as TGCo delivers to
FWC and FWC receives the proceeds of the three hundred thousand dollars
($300,000) loan as contemplated by the Lol and this Revision. Further, FWC and
TGCo mutually agree that FWC has sole right not to accept the three hundred
thousand dollars ($300,000) loan from TGCo if the terms and conditions thereof, as
they are more fully described in loan documents yet to be created, are not acceptable
for any reason whatsoever or if the business terms and conditions associated with
the loan are unfavorable in the sole opinion of FWC. Further, the Lol and this
Revision comprise the total good faith negotiations, representations, responsibilities
and obligations to date which may exist between FWC and TGCo and the conditions
under which FWC may agree to accept, extend or modify the same are subject to the
approval of the FWC Board of Directors and shall only become binding upon FWC
with that approval.
All other provisions of the Lol are to remain in full force and effect without
modification. Furthermore, the parties mutually agree to provide all reasonable
assistance and cooperation to each other in order to complete the transactions
described in the Lol on a timely basis, without interruption, interference, or
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diversion of resources to proposals by any third parties, or inaction or omission by
the parties themselves. However, if for any reason, the TGCo options specified in
paragraph 1 above are not exercised byjyly 31, 1995, the transactions of the Lol are
null and void.
Please signify your acceptance of these modifications to the Lol by signing
below and on the attached signed copy. This letter agreement modifying the Lol may
be executed in counterparts, wherein the collective signed documents shall
constitute one and the same agreement. Please return one executed copy to me so
that each party shall retain an executed original of the final agreement.
Signed,
TI^GEOTHERMAL COMPANY ("TGCo")

Dr. JinLCombs, President
Date:

M

^

Agreed and Accepted:
FAR WEST CAPITAL, INC.

("FWC0

Mr. Ron Burch, Vice President
Date:

SlAAr^
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By
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
S.ALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE GEOTHERMAL COMPANY,
a Nevada corporation,

ORDER AND JUDGlfgft

m

i

m

-.,„

i

Third Judiciai i>

Plaintiff,

;t

DEC 1 6 ' ^ ~

vs.

FAR WEST CAPITAL, INC.,
a Utah corporation, STEAMBOAT
DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Utah
corporation

Deputy ClerK

Civil No. 990906774
Judge: Bohling

Defendants.

On November 29, 1999, the court heard oral argument from all parties on
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff was represented by Michael L.
Labertew and defendants were represented by Mary Anne Q. Wood. Having considered the
documents filed with the court, the arguments presented at the hearing, and for good cause
appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that accepting all facts presented
in the complaint as true, defendants motion to dismiss the complaint is granted. Pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the parties' letter of intent in particular paragraph 7 of the second
amendment to the letter of intent, the defendants exercised their right to cancel the agreement and
not proceed with the contemplated transaction. Accordingly, defendants did not breach the

IHH

written agreement and the claim for breach of written agreement is dismissed. Because the
written agreement was for an interest in real property the Statute of Frauds applies. Under clear
and unambiguous language in paragraph 7 of the second amendment to the letter of intent and
under the Statute of Frauds, oral modifications and/or agreements were prohibited. Therefore,
defendants did not breach any oral agreements. Where the parties had a written agreement,
plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for quantum meruit or quasi-contract and therefore those claims
are dismissed. It is undisputed that plaintiff failed to state a claim for fraud. Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), all of plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this /£

day of December 1999
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

Judge William B. Bohling
APPROVED AS TO FORM

MJJJJi-MicMael L. Labertew
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